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Global prescriptions and neglect of the “local”:  
What lessons for global health governance has the Framework 
Convention on Global Health learned? 
 
Anuj Kapilashrami, Suzanne Fustukian, Barbara McPake  
  
 
The Framework Convention on Global Health comes amid wider recognition of 
health inequalities and several recent calls for greater democratization of the world 
order. The framework suggests wider consensus on principles of human rights, 
equity and justice in addressing global health. In this paper, we draw on our 
empirical research and wider literature to discuss the lessons learned from the 
application of global “ideas” and “innovations” and reveal institutional and 
political processes and structural constraints that affect their implementation. We 
present our approach on the basis of two key arguments. First, gross inequalities 
and unequal distributional effects of the current global political and economic 
environment do not offer a level playing field for nation states to translate 
principles enshrined in the framework into practice. Second, such a “view from 
above” undermines processes of empowering communities to create responsive 
health systems. Through a case vignette of the People’s Health Movement, we then 
discuss substantive ways to facilitate local ideas and action.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Several calls for a global movement and “planetary action” for health equity have 
been issued in the recent past.1 These respond to an on-going crisis in global health, 
which is characterized by growing social and health inequities within and among 
nations, increasing trans-border threats of disease outbreaks, and dominance of 
perverse market forces,2 making public health incidental to trade and economic 
growth.3  
Concerned with persistent indefensible differences in life chances of a child 
born in Sub-Saharan Africa and another in North America, the global health 
community is drawn into discussions on what might a post-2015 development 
agenda look like. As debate on the much touted ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ 
gathers heat, global health actors are unified in their desire to explore solutions to 
contemporary challenges in global health. One such proposal, the Framework 
Convention for Global Health, would create a global health treaty advanced by a 
coalition of academics and civil society members, namely the Joint Action and 
Learning Initiative. The framework responds to concerns about fragmentation of the 
global health system and the weakening of the World Health Organization and other 
institutions charged with global governance.4 Endorsed by the UN Secretary-
General, the framework purports to “reimagine global governance for health” as 
structured around human rights, equity and justice, and legally bind governments to 
standards that catalyze accountability and guarantee inclusive participation. It 
establishes clear goals in response to seven “grand challenges in global health” 
identified as struggling leadership, inadequate and volatile funding, poor 
coordination, neglected priorities, reduced accountability, and insufficient 
intersectoral influence5. These goals include increasing government health spending 
for domestic and external needs, re-setting global governance arrangements for 
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health through incremental protocol negotiations, and realizing the human right to 
health by clarifying the necessity of universal health coverage. The proposal has 
garnered wider support on national and global responsibilities for health, due to its 
transformative intent in reforming global health governance. The framework is not 
without its critics. Several concerns have been articulated, not least about the 
‘unintended’ consequences likely to result from its implementation. Critics draw 
attention to direct and opportunity costs of such international law, mainly reducing 
possibilities of political dialogue, imposing foreign values and externally defined 
goals on less powerful nations, prioritizing individual rights over issues that merit 
population-wide responses, and offering sub-optimal solutions for challenges to 
global health.6 In addition, these scholars argue that framework proposals, through 
development of new protocols, structures and obligations, duplicate efforts and 
undermine existing human rights treaties. Of significance are conflicting mandates of 
the regime likely to implement the framework and the functions and mandate of the 
World Health Assemblies. Such tension is likely to contribute to weakening the WHO 
although the proposal recognizes its centrality to the Framework’s governance 
architecture.  
The unparalleled interest received by this proposal brings to the forefront 
historic debates on universalist vs relativist paradigms for development.  There are 
important questions to be asked about how such rights-based frameworks in global 
health can be operationalized given the conceptual ambiguity around what 
constitutes ‘global health’7 and its varied use, both descriptive and prescriptive.8 
Also, what are the limits in its application in a non level-playing field marked by 
significant geo-political, economic and historical differences? Lastly, these debates 
must facilitate critical reflections on why historic milestones in global health such as 
the promises of Alma Ata and other conventions /declarations did not bear fruit.  In 
this paper, we ask some of these fundamental questions by drawing on our empirical 
research on international health systems and policy to reflect on what we stand to 
gain and lose from applying universal prescriptions to improve ‘global health’. We 
first present a brief account of the global health governance landscape, and the 
scholarship defining it, in order to illustrate the unprecedented growth in the quest 
for normative frameworks for good governance. Through two case vignettes we then 
explicate the contestations and implications of applying ideas without critical 
reflection on their normative underpinnings, the processes through which 
institutional arrangements are mediated, and their underlying structural and 
contextual determinants. These, we argue, are important lessons to be learned from 
history with implications for the application of the Framework Convention on Global 
Health.   
 
GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE AND ITS QUEST FOR NORMS, IDEAS AND VALUES  
 
Global Health Governance is a rapidly expanding field of scholarship. The term, 
coined by Dodgson and colleagues,9 emerged amid growing recognition of the impact 
of globalization on health determinants and outcomes and the arguable limits of 
nation-states in determining matters transcending national frontiers.10  
For the purpose of this paper, we restrict the study to describing key 
characteristics of the concept and discussing its normative dimension. We adopt the 
conception of Global Health Governance as a complex open adaptive system,11 but 
also as a “process of contestation”12 between a variety of different ideas and 
discourses, each of which takes a particular approach to health and generates certain 
policy responses. Global health governance can thus be defined in terms of its key 
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constituents, namely i) architecture and organization (or the lack thereof) with 
multiple actors, their transient relationships, and complex networks they are 
embedded in; ii) core functions; and iii) normative ideas and frameworks that create 
paradigms for investments in health.  
 
Governance ‘architecture’ is the “overarching system of public and private 
institutions, principles, norms, regulations, decision making procedures and 
organizations that are valid or active in a given issue area of world politics”.13 The 
contemporary governance architecture is characterized by an ‘unstructured 
plurality’,14 whereby new actors emerge/ are created (for example, 120+ global health 
initiatives that provide a substantial portion of funding and products) while pre-
existing actors (e.g. World Bank, private foundations, NGOs) re-define or carve out 
new roles for themselves in health. This has re-configured the political space for 
global health; first, the focus of decision-making is shifting as power is getting 
dispersed from G8 concentration to growing economies and regional powers 
represented by the G20 (especially emerging economies), and the recently founded 
G7+1.15 While this shift challenges the broader political/institutional relationship of 
power (and strengthens southern nation-states,16 including those perceived as 
‘fragile’), in itself it does not trigger equity in health. Rather, as some have argued, 
health priorities are becoming secondary to finance, trade and security objectives.17 
Second, greater engagement with non-state actors has undermined legitimacy of the 
state, across several functions of governance including agenda setting, enabling 
dispersion of power and decision making among multi-lateral institutions. Global 
health governance literature is deficient in examining state sovereignty and growing 
legitimacy of non-state actors vis-à-vis the roles and functions of governance. Peter 
Haas purports that “effective governance rests on the performance of multiple 
governance functions”,18 formally or indirectly performed. He outlines 12 core 
functions of governance, from agenda setting and issue linkage to monitoring and 
capacity building (through technology and skill transfer), and maps these across 
diverse actors while evaluating their performance. The Framework Convention does 
not offer insights into how either the international community or nation-states 
(constituencies cited) will perform these different functions, and how a human rights 
framing can affect such division of task. 
 
Normative ideas and frameworks towards ‘good’ governance   
 
Several proposals have been put forward to correct deficiencies inherent in the 
existing global health governance system and the vagaries of international 
development assistance in health. Some call for transformative changes to redress 
the “unconscionable health gap”19 (e.g., Global Plan for Justice); others propose 
strengthening of existing institutions, for example, through formation of Committee 
C of the World Health Assembly20 or the creation of new entities (e.g., a Global Fund 
for Health). Proposals seek to either address cross-cutting challenges facing the 
global health community (e.g., UN Global Health Panel) or target specific policy 
areas and constituencies to ensure equitable drug development and distribution (e.g., 
Health Impact Fund for incentivizing pharmaceuticals) and achieve sustainable and 
ethical economies (UN Global Compact for businesses). Notably, the latter 
                                                 
1 The G7+ established a new foundation for collaboration between 20 fragile states, donor nations and 
other global governance structures focused on state building and peacebuilding, based on the 
principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.  
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agreements are premised predominantly on mutual advantage and cooperation 
strategies.  
This persistent quest for innovations in institutional arrangements and 
approaches to managing the externalities arising from intensive cross-border flows 
have come to define the global health governance system and produced a complex 
mosaic of institutions,21 often with overlapping norms and constituencies. These 
innovations take a variety of forms: i) regulatory “trans-border-agreements” to 
protect health, for example formal instruments such as the Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control (FCTC), International Health Regulations (IHR); ii) technical 
interventions and technological silver bullet solutions to global health problems22 
that are often determined by institutions (such as the Gates Foundation) largely with 
representations from HICs; iii) new funding mechanisms and incentives to correct 
resource scarcities and low prioritization of specific health problems, which have 
given rise to a number of disease-specific and product development partnerships that 
are perceived to enhance ‘country ownership’;23 and iv) application of unifying 
international principles for achievement of ‘good’ global governance. While there is 
no consensus on conceptions of ‘good’ governance and therefore principles to attain 
it, the hegemonic ‘problem solving’ discourse tends to focus on creating structures to 
enhance administrative efficiency and management24 to correct perceived 
governance failures defined primarily in terms of corruption, transparency and 
accountability problems in fund utilization and procurement /supply chains as well 
as those emerging from uncoordinated action.25 These principles are embraced by 
mechanisms adopted by complex configurations of state and non-state actors and 
their assemblages into ‘public-private partnerships’ to steer achievement of public 
health goals.  
There is a simultaneous resurgence of interest in equity, rights and social 
justice as the basis for health investments and programming, and more broadly in re-
shaping substantive ways in which ‘the system beyond governments’ be governed.26 
These notions of solidarity and justice are taken up by all, albeit with varying degrees 
of acceptance and incremental or piecemeal approaches.27 These developments 
occurred in the context of wider support by donors and global actors, and in the last 
decade, to more integrative modalities of aid such as sector wide approaches, poverty 
reduction strategy papers (PRSP), and direct budgetary support, although these 
make greater use of economic frameworks in decision-making.28  
Scholars offer a range of economic and political explanations for the failures 
of global health governance29. However, few address how these factors are 
maintained and reinforced by existing approaches. Critical scholarship, albeit 
limited, questions structural inequities, power imbalance and ethical foundations of 
global health governance calling for transformative shifts30. As well as material 
power, popular policy ‘innovations’ are shaped by deeply entrenched ideas or 
frameworks of thought,31 both of which must be examined for a careful assessment 
of the contemporary field of global health governance.32 One such hegemonic idea 
structuring this field is that of neoliberalism, which has evolved over a period 
marked by economic, political and financial crisis and shrinks any alternative policy 
space and sites of resistance.33  
Neoliberalism serves as the overarching logic for several contemporary 
paradigms and framings of the global health and public policy agenda.  Rushton and 
William34 articulate three ways in which neoliberalism shapes global health policy: 
first, through the roll back of the state, thus dispersing power across a wider range of 
both public and private actors, and second by promoting the uptake of a series of 
policy preferences by powerful actors, notably the international finance institutions 
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who apply these across countries through a variety of mechanisms. These policy 
preferences underscore liberalized and privatized health care systems and 
economies, and explain current policy trends. Neoliberalism shapes global health 
policy in a third way by colonizing many global health paradigms and concealing the 
macro-economic, political, and social determinants of health. Initiatives and 
conventions designed to enable coherence (such as IHP+, Health 8, Paris 
declaration) have gained traction. However, these remain focused on vertical 
program delivery in countries, with limited attention paid to upstream drivers of 
health concerning changes in agriculture, trade, and other policy sectors.  
We illustrate these pathways through specific examples of reform attempts 
within the global health system; through principles of participation and human 
rights; and the policy approach of health systems strengthening. We present two case 
vignettes that demonstrate contingencies of practice and the extent to which the 
hidden transcript of policy innovation and its underpinning principles depart from 
the public transcript. A third case study then illustrates a case of organic bottom-up 
reforms that have both normative and substantive impact in health governance.  
 
CASE VIGNETTE: GLOBAL HEALTH INITIATIVES’ TRYST WITH RIGHTS AND EQUITY   
 
Global health initiatives (GHIs) have assumed dominance within global health policy 
networks35 and are regarded as the backbone of the global response to HIV.36 In 
particular, the Global Fund, PEPFAR, and GAVI Alliance, together with new 
philanthropies, namely the Gates Foundation, are credited for leveraging 
unprecedented amounts of financial resources for the roll-out of large scale 
treatment programs, especially ARV and other life-saving therapies, and associated 
with a significant reduction in rates of new infections and associated mortality.37 
Notwithstanding these gains, GHIs came under severe criticism for their unintended 
consequences (fragmentation, competition, misalignment with national/ local 
priorities) implicating already weak health systems.38 Responding, in part, to these 
criticisms as well as growing policy consensus on aid effectiveness, a number of more 
prominent GHIs have embraced the Health Systems Strengthening (HSS) agenda.39 
Such renewed commitment to health systems, and more recently human rights,40 
comes amid international debates on the trade-offs between vertical programs and 
integrated health care; short-term health goals (and provision of life-saving therapy) 
and building sustainable health systems. It is reflected in recent strategic frameworks 
of GHIs such as the Global Fund, GAVI Alliance and in program priorities endorsed 
by other global health actors. A recent assessment of the Global Fund’s Round 8 
grants shows that 37% (US$ 362 million) of funding in Round 8 was devoted to 
health system strengthening.41  
Viewed as a positive development in the fractured global health system, GHIs 
embracing “the health system action agenda” (WHO 2006) has been argued to be 
“putting to rest the longstanding debate of vertical vs horizontal approaches”.42 
However, recent evidence reveals significant departure from the rhetoric supportive 
of holistic health systems. Storeng43 illustrates how by adopting the above rhetoric, 
GHIs and the World Bank have captured the global debate about HSS in favor of 
their specific ethos and single-minded focus on vaccines or specific diseases. 
Through ethnography of GAVI, Storeng reveals how its support to HSS is partly 
conditional on a set of targets for immunization/ vaccination coverage. Although the 
HSS strategy espouses the principles of aid harmonization and country ownership, in 
practice, any proposals for mitigating negative health system effects arising from 
their grants (such as reducing reporting burden by adhering to country systems) 
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were dismissed. In effect, the systems approach was reduced to strengthening the 
components needed to achieve disease–specific goals; suggesting a significant 
departure from the comprehensive vision and legacy of the Declaration of Alma Ata. 
Globally, the power and political expediency enjoyed by global partnerships such as 
the GAVI Alliance and large philanthropies backing these have led to an “ideological 
convergence around the so-called ‘Gates approach’ to global health”,44 whereby, as 
typical of the techno-managerial paradigm within global health, debates on health 
systems are re-cast as technical debates about healthcare and product delivery 
systems. These findings resonate with our country level research on the 
governmentality of the Global Fund and contracting experiences in health systems 
of fragile states.  
A simultaneous resurgence of interest in the principles of rights and social 
justice as the basis for health investments and programming can be seen since 2009. 
Arising in part from recognition of the failure of neoliberal health reforms adopted in 
LMICs to reach the most poor and vulnerable,45 these principles have made their way 
into public transcripts of several global health institutions. However, where 
principles of human rights and social justice have been included, they have been 
molded into existing approaches, as evidenced by the new funding strategy of the 
Global Fund, which incorporates human rights in a narrative structured around i) 
more rigorous performance based funding, ii) fiduciary risk management, whereby 
aid is granted on the basis of recipients’ rankings on international benchmarks of 
good governance; and iii) financial austerity emphasizing value for money.46 Critical 
evidence on global health initiatives has emerged globally as well as in countries such 
as India, South Africa, Zambia, and Peru. This evidence is examined below to 
highlight how principles of partnership, participation, and human rights are 
translated at the national level and into local practices, and the extent to which these 
transform global governance.  
The term partnership implies collaborative development and implementation 
of policy with community involvement, consistent with principles of good 
governance.47 However, partnership is being effectively used, at the global level, by 
powerful commercial interests to gain a seat at the decision-making table, while 
marginalizing less powerful communities and voices. Global agencies unequivocally 
seek civil society representation and participation as a gateway to enhanced 
representation, transparency and accountability,48 the three tenets of reforming and 
democratizing the global health system. However, decision making in their governing 
bodies continues to be skewed with the private sector ‘over represented’ despite their 
modest contributions, and the WHO and civil society constituency under 
represented.49 The Global Fund has been at the forefront of this debate. At the 
country level, through its structures including country coordinating mechanisms, the 
Global Fund is credited for fostering country ownership and creating space for 
participation of sections of communities hitherto marginalized in the political 
process, such as men who have sex with men in China or people who use drugs.50 
However, detailed analysis and ethnography of the governmentality of the Global 
Fund in India revealed how grant disbursements and management structures steer 
the direction of program priorities, privilege donors, NGOs and national elite 
networks over grassroot initiatives in decision making forums,51 reinforcing the 
democratic deficit characteristic of the contemporary global health governance 
landscape.  
Evidence from other countries corroborates these findings and suggests that 
the pursuit of goals of participation and rights by global health actors has been 
tokenistic. Entry of the Global Fund and the authority of its protocol have 
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transformed HIV governance in various ways. Studies suggest that annual grant 
making calls resulted in a proliferation of consortia with sometimes overlapping 
objectives and activities competing for funding and legitimacy in country level policy 
and governance. While some local groups received greater visibility and leverage to 
influence national policies, they were simultaneously exposed to inflexible funding 
and associated conditionalities. Pressures for scale-up, demonstrating achievement 
of targets (such as improvements in adherence rates) through computerized 
information systems resulted in opportunism and manipulation at facility level, loss 
of social capital, and a shift from more critical and political to technical and 
managerial discourses.52  
 
CASE VIGNETTE: OPERATIONALIZING THE POLICY INNOVATION OF CONTRACTING 
OUT IN CAMBODIA, A ‘FRAGILE’ STATE 
 
Greater attention to ‘fragile states’ began in the late 1990s with a concern that ‘good 
governance’ and aid effectiveness agendas had overlooked situations of conflict or 
weakly governed states.53 Such states are considered to “lack the functional authority 
to provide basic security within their borders, the institutional capacity to provide 
basic social needs for their populations, and/or the political legitimacy to effectively 
represent their citizens at home or abroad.”54 The fragile state concept, now 
normalised and applied to many diverse situations, was mainly “intended to guide 
the interactions and relationships between donor countries and recipient countries 
facing conflict and poverty”.55 In these situations, the donors are in the driving seat, a 
predicament acknowledged by Akwetey,56 who states: “fragility involves a heavy 
dependence on external assistance in the spheres of political, economic and social 
governance.”  The policy of ‘contracting out’ as a mechanism for the delivery of 
public health services has been widely applied in fragile states such as Afghanistan, 
Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and South Sudan.57 
In Cambodia, the institutional, technical, and management capacity of the 
health system, at the end of the war in 1991, had deteriorated significantly, 
particularly with the dramatic loss of many professionals to the years of genocide and 
on-going war.58 From a recent life history study with Cambodian people regarding 
episodes of illness, deaths and births of participants to the years of genocide and on-
going war,59 it was apparent that many had relied solely on self-medication and 
indigenous practitioners for much of the period up to 2000.60  Given these 
constraints and the urgent need to re-establish a functioning health system, it 
appeared sensible—to the donors—to introduce ccontracting into the public health 
system in ‘partnership’ with the state, particularly where the contractors were well-
known international NGOs with established track records in Cambodia and other 
fragile states.61 Introduction of contracting in fragile contexts often allows states with 
limited institutional capacity to deliver health services within a relatively short 
period of time,62 addressing health care needs of the local population. The trade-off 
is that state mechanisms may be bypassed by donors and contracting agencies, 
anxious to achieve relatively quick returns in terms of health coverage. This 
potentially undermines the much longer-term process of re-engaging citizens and the 
government through a ‘social contract’ with the public.63  
In fragile states, posing the problem in terms of expanding health coverage 
alone presents tensions with the wider objectives of state-building and 
peacebuilding, considered by several64 as core processes in re-establishing effective 
services. The tensions arise from different perspectives on what should be prioritised 
– universal health coverage delivered by non-state actors, or rebuilding the 
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legitimacy of the state. Fritz and Menochal65 suggest that the legitimacy aimed for in 
fragile states is often normative, and does “not derive from its ability to produce 
outcomes (including economic growth and service delivery), but rather rests on a 
principled commitment to the democratic process.” Kruk et.al66 suggest a more 
instrumental legitimacy calling for specific attention to the health system’s political, 
social and capacity-building functions when designing the strategy for its 
rehabilitation as it “may help national governments and international development 
partners to harness the potential gains in social cohesion and rebuilding of trust that 
are critical to state-building.67 The contracting model, introduced and implemented 
by external agencies and contractors, however, produces limited accountability to 
either the state or the population, and facilitates an ongoing “condition of aid 
dependence”68 and donor surveillance. 
Baird and Hammer 69 have documented how the policy on contracting-out was 
designed poorly for the circumstances of the remote North-East province of 
Ratanakiri in Cambodia. Ratanakiri was selected for inclusion in the second stage of 
contracting-out on the basis of its high levels of poverty and vulnerability. Following 
the health system strengthening policy introduced in 1996, operational districts were 
created across Cambodia, covering between 100,000 and 200,000 people; in the 
weaker operational districts, a policy of contracting-out to international NGOs was 
implemented to try to achieve wide coverage of the population with a ‘Minimum 
Package of Care’. An innovation in the Cambodian experience was the introduction of 
the Health Equity Fund (HEF), which aimed not only to offset the charging of user 
fees on the poor,70  but to cover transport, food and related costs.71 In Ratanakiri, the 
HEF component was under-financed as the contract designers had failed to 
recognize the higher proportion of the population that would qualify, and had to be 
suspended.72 The project design also failed to recognize that the social relations of 
indigenous groups in Ratanakiri tended not to be mediated through cash 
transactions leaving user fees an extremely unpopular mechanism for health care 
funding. Equally excluding were the communication difficulties between Khmer 
speaking health staff and the population’s more prevalent indigenous languages. 
Narrow measures of program ‘success’ failed to capture the breadth of health sector 
activities; for example TB services were not incentivized, and consequently appeared 
to be neglected. Neither did the contractor fully engage in building the capacity of 
local state health actors, considered a central component of the stated model; for 
example, the health budget of the international contractors was not revealed to them, 
leaving a critical gap. Of particular concern, Baird and Hammer found no evidence of 
a sophisticated understanding of local realities when establishing the contracting 
arrangements; they describe lip service to the requirement for participatory planning 
mechanisms by which implementers might have developed useful learning, and 
document a lack of effort of the implementing NGO to build capacity in the 
operational district.  
Couched under the systems strengthening agenda, the contracting experience 
of Cambodia has been widely viewed as successful innovation, premised on analyses 
of national household surveys, and experience in a few specific sites. On the basis of 
this evidence, there has been widespread enthusiasm for the rolling out and scaling 
up of a generic model. However, the evidence cited above suggests, there is 
insufficient recognition of the specifics of contexts into which global policy models 
have been rolled out and scaled up which is likely to be detrimental to the 
populations of regions distinctly different across diverse contexts. It is evident that 
health system interventions in fragile states often follow similar templates in 
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situations “qualitatively different from one another, with unique problems that often 
require novel policy responses.”73  
 
THE (DIS)CONTENTS OF FCGH AND THE RISK OF SUBVERSION OF THE RIGHT TO 
HEALTH 
 
The two case vignettes presented above focus on distinct ideas of policy ‘innovations’ 
that are couched in progressive conceptions and normative goals of attempted health 
systems and governance reform in diverse social, economic and political realities. 
The first draws on emergent scholarship on critical ethnographies of GHIs (including 
the primary author’s research) that examine the contested social processes through 
which local effects of global policies are produced, and legitimized. This body of 
literature opposes the dominant view that “local” effects are “unintended 
consequences” of well-meaning global health actors, and challenges the perceived 
neutrality and desirability of such initiatives.74 In the dominant view, any failures 
arising in countries are credited to inefficiencies in decision making, resulting from 
weak governance and ill-defined hosting arrangements at country level75 and to the 
dynamics of “open source anarchy.”76 Extending this argument, reform in global 
health governance is likely to be achieved through creation and/or endorsement of 
policy innovations towards a more centralized, harmonized regime (through aid 
effectiveness, systems strengthening, and principles of rights and justice), as also 
suggested by the Framework. Instead, we argue that these failures are inevitable 
outcomes of structures that are underpinned by the logic of competition and 
embedded in a neoliberal discourse. For example, studies examining the GHIs in 
India, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia illustrate how grant disbursement 
structures, and the push for rapid scale-up and performance- and target-based 
approaches foster competition. This serves to reproduce power asymmetries and 
differences between international and local, for-profit and non-profit entities, and 
affect the most disadvantaged. The latter is evident in the second case vignette, 
which examines how the wider health systems strengthening debate, and its specific 
proposal of “contracting out” to extend coverage, plays out in Cambodia, a context 
reflecting political, institutional and social fragility. In this context, adoption of 
health equity and participatory proposals within an externally developed and 
implemented program did little to prevent further weakening of a system hollowed 
out through decades of colonialism, political conflict, and macro-economic reforms. 
Nor did the presence of “global” implementers, who were aware of “constraints such 
as language, culture, poverty and access”77 routinely faced by the indigenous 
population, alter their program in ways that would reduce their exclusion from 
services and guarantee their “right to health.” The potential to build capacity and 
local ownership, to re-engage with the public health system by both health workers 
and local population, was thus undermined. 
Against this backdrop, despite its commitment to proposals with a 
redistributive intent, the proposed Framework is implicated in some fundamental 
flaws. We discuss these below.  
 
Rationale 
 
The Framework Convention on Global Health is premised on the success of two 
binding multilateral treaties: the IHR and the FCTC. These, arguably, demonstrate 
the “potential of hard law to improve health outcomes,” albeit with inconclusive 
evidence on how policy changes facilitated by the treaties affected health outcomes in 
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countries, nor the nature of civil society engagement these evoked. The proposal 
recognizes their singular focus and limitations in addressing key social determinants 
of health and establishes the insufficiency of ‘soft law’ (codes and declarations) for 
ensuring global health justice, making a compelling argument for a broader 
framework that allows a marriage of the two to achieve this.  
While the Framework recognizes key governance challenges (for example, 
mis-aligned priorities, trade and economic regimes impacting health goals, fund 
volatility and differential capacities) and their country level effects, the structures 
and mechanisms producing these are treated as largely unproblematic, and therefore 
replicative. Global endeavors such as the Global Fund are described as “embodying 
several key principles of good global governance,” and failures attributed to the 
‘voluntary nature of its funding scheme.”  As we demonstrate in the cases above, the 
key governance threat that GHIs such as the Global Fund present is not the depleting 
funding pledges but the additional burden their funding mechanisms, parallel 
systems, and conditionality generate.  The cases also illustrate the need for re-
orienting the debate on obligations in the multi-level global health system to 
highlight the responsibility of (and to hold to account) transnational elites. Not only 
do diseases cross borders and issues have a global genesis, global actors (commercial 
and non-commercial) influence policy response at the national and sub-national 
level by leveraging resources and mutually co-producing outcomes through 
‘partnerships’ with national elites i.e. wealthy and influential actors who control and/ 
or benefit from maintenance of power in the global health enterprise.  
 
Gap between analysis and solutions  
 
Recommendations proposed for an effective global health governance architecture 
fall short of the robust analysis of governance challenges developed in the proposal. 
Onus is primarily put on nation-states in meeting the human-rights based targets, 
while the role of the international community is limited primarily to managing fiscal 
deficits. Furthermore, the Framework lays emphasis on a target/ indicator driven 
approach, which as country studies demonstrate, fosters competition, opportunism, 
narrow constructions of health system strengthening, and lack of accountability to 
local populations. Disproportionate attention is given to alternative financing 
innovations,78  and channeling funding through the global fund for health is 
envisaged as the solution to simplify the complex and politically contested landscape 
of health actors. While the Framework strongly commits to refining priorities locally 
through participatory, equitable processes, it is not clear how such bottom-up, 
inclusive processes would operate; nor how this will be distinct from what earlier and 
ongoing endeavors, such as PRSP and the SDGs, aimed to achieve.  
 
Why have transformative proposals and promises of Alma Ata not delivered? 
 
In their review of the Primary Health Care (PHC) strategy, De Maeseneer and 
colleagues79 examine the factors underpinning the failure of Alma Ata. Some of those 
failures are attributed to the philosophical conflicts between selective and 
comprehensive primary health care and the presence of ideology over concrete, 
adaptable practice recommendations. PHC was perceived by many as not only a 
roadmap to achieving international health equity, but also an approach 
encompassing social and political reform.80 In the period immediately following 
Alma Ata, the wider macro-economic environment propelled by the oil crisis, global 
recession, and the introduction by development banks of Structural Adjustment 
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Programmes, shifted national budgets away from social services, including health.81 
As Abhay Shukla82 highlights in his powerful critique of the Alma Ata Declaration, 
“however noble the intentions..., these could not be converted into action if the forces 
blocking the way to ‘Health for all’ were not identified and challenged;” Thus for a 
reimagined global health governance, its structures and institutions must be 
fundamentally revamped. Binding nation states to human rights is not sufficient, and 
far from transformative for global health governance. While states continue to be 
“normatively and empirically the most appealing primary locus for social 
cooperation in health”83 solutions to health problems that are rooted in political and 
commercial interests demand wider mechanisms for ensuring moral responsibility 
and remediating harm from actions of global actors (that produce conditions that 
hinder protection and promotion of individual and population health). It is unclear 
how the Framework proposes to address one of the key challenges for global health 
today, i.e. ensuring meaningful accountability, in particular holding corporations 
accountable beyond proposals for enforcing taxation policies. The Framework 
instead makes a more significant contribution to strengthening accountability of 
nation states (and systems) to their people. In the vignette below, we describe an 
alternative approach to attaining a similar objective.  
 
STRENGTHENING HEALTH GOVERNANCE FROM BELOW: THE PEOPLE’S HEALTH 
MOVEMENT (PHM) 
 
The World Health Conference in Alma Ata (1978) ended with the promise of ‘Health 
for All by 2000’. Despite the failure to achieve HFA, the year 2000 marked an 
important year for advancing equity and social justice in health. At its onset, civil 
societies across the world mobilized under the umbrella of the PHM to 
commemorate the goal of HFA and propose an alternative vision and pathway to 
realize the right to health, resulting in a people’s health assembly (PHA) in 
Bangladesh in December 2000. As part of this movement, Indian civil society 
facilitated a country-wide process to examine progress towards HFA in India, which 
led to the establishment of Jan Swasthya Abhiyan (People’s Health Campaign). In 
the years since 2000, the JSA has emerged as a key policy advocate on health.  
At the 25th anniversary of ‘Health for All’ in 2003, JSA launched a nationwide 
campaign on the ‘Right to Health Care’. In collaboration with the National Human 
Rights Commission (NHRC), JSA held a series of public hearings across India, where 
violations of health rights (including denial of care, sub-standard care, and failure to 
address wider determinants such as occupational health hazards) were heard and 
redressed by a panel. These further informed a national public consultation where 
over 250 JSA members from 16 states analyzed the content of the Right to Health 
Care and, jointly with NHRC, developed a campaign strategy to recognize it as a 
fundamental right, outlining constitutional obligations for the state. Cognizant of the 
outstanding need to strengthen weak and dysfunctional public health systems in 
rural India, JSA members became involved in shaping, critiquing, and monitoring 
the National Rural Health Mission, the country’s flagship health program launched 
in 2005. In particular, through its strong grassroots networks within states, JSA 
contributed to strengthening public health systems by empowering communities to 
be involved in the planning and utilization of these systems through a rights-based 
framework. Members shaped the community based monitoring (CBM) approach, a 
mechanism implemented within the mission that aims to strengthen the citizen-state 
relationship and ensure accountability of health systems. Although CBM continues to 
evolve as a methodology and in terms of coverage, emerging evidence reveals 
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tangible contributions to the strengthening of health services. Besides improvements 
in quality of care, recent independent external evaluations84 emphasize its potential 
to empower communities to demand services, and to create positive pressure on the 
system to become more responsive and accountable. The CBM experience in 
Maharashtra85 reported an increase of 18 percent (from 48% to 66%) in the 
community’s rating of health services as ‘good’ and a decline in the percentage of 
services rated ‘bad’ (25% to 14%) over three subsequent cycles of monitoring. 
Improvements were also observed across specific indicators, for example, 
immunization services, supplementary nutrition, and use of untied funds by 21 (from 
69% to 90%), 33 and 31 percentage points respectively; and PHC level services such 
as 24-hour delivery, in-patient services, laboratory, and ambulance services. More 
significantly, qualitative changes were reported in availability, attitudes and practices 
of health workers (elimination of unnecessary prescriptions and user charges for 
services) as well as health systems provision of safe drinking water and sanitation 
facilities,86 indicating appropriate and “effective coverage” aspired to by the 
Framework. Further, growing acceptance among health officials of the significance of 
community-led action has transformative potential for health systems strengthening 
agendas. The CBM approach, though specific to health services, offers a pathway for 
extending commitments on universal health coverage to a broader set of social 
services. Concurrently, another mechanism adopted by the JSA involved successfully 
lobbying national political parties before the general elections to include the right to 
healthcare in their election manifestos and commit to an increase in health spending. 
The JSA continues to be one of the leading overseers of health policy implementation 
and campaigner for strengthened social accountability processes within health 
systems in India.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The above vignette reinforces the notion that States have particular ethical 
obligations to their citizens, and, more importantly, this model of responsibility 
allocation and social accountability can be invoked through citizen-led action 
premised on principles of justice and agency. There is growing traction for normative 
approaches that incorporate voices from the ground and include concepts such as 
agency and capabilities central to flourishing human lives. For example, frameworks 
of shared health governance and provincial globalism87 recognize the need for a 
consensus on the morality of health, not a top-down world government with coercive 
powers to compel compliance. 
While our thesis departs from the premise of shared health governance, that 
all actors will aspire towards global health justice, and that chaos is an unintended 
consequence of their actions, we concur that creating conditions for global 
distributive justice (and ensuring functionality and morality of global health) 
requires a multi-level system of, as Ruger argues, “mutually reinforcing governments 
(nation states) and governance (both global and domestic) and a strong evaluative 
structure.”88  
At the country level, citizen-led processes and principles embraced by such 
normative frameworks such as self- determination and individual and collective 
agency, hold promise. The Framework recognizes the value of this bottom-up 
approach but only so far as countering “the opportunist costs of an arduous treaty 
process”, carving a role for civil society in monitoring the compliance of nation-states 
to the Framework obligations, and in the process enhancing their access to 
governments and legitimizing their advocacy roles. This does not resonate with the 
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emancipatory objectives of bottom-up approaches described above. Moreover, at the 
global level, mere representation in policies and governing bodies of global health 
institutions, albeit promising, does not necessarily translate to exercising sovereignty 
and agency given the power and resource asymmetries. Thus, simultaneously 
realizing the systems of government and governance (at the global and domestic 
levels) requires different degrees and explicit instruments to establish harm, 
causality and evaluate public standards of accountability of state and non-state 
actors at the global and national levels. Notably, what is needed is an assessment of 
who is responsible, and thus accountable, for undermining health equity. This 
necessitates the development of mechanisms of effect and instruments established to 
shape the public norms (of accountability towards who the global health system is 
purported to serve) necessary for a normative structure of global health rooted in a 
theory of justice.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Recently, the WHO Director General declared the West African Ebola crisis a “public 
health emergency of international concern” underscoring the urgency of coordinated 
action and the imperative of strengthening capacities and systems of low income 
states.  Amit Sengupta argues that the analysis of factors responsible for 
concentration of the epidemic in West Africa must go beyond the focus on pathology 
of the disease to address “the pathology of our society and the global political and 
economic architecture.”89 Decades of civil, political and economic unrest (triggered 
by colonial rule followed by neoliberal economic reforms) have systematically eroded 
capacities of health systems in low-income countries. Such weakened capacities have 
created conditions where outbreaks, such as Ebola, fester.  
Amid this crisis, the Framework is timely and its call for a new law that binds 
nation states resonates with anxiety in many areas and constituencies of 
international relations for governance reform.  However, the Framework needs 
clarity in its purpose. Nation-states are central to any guarantees of human rights to 
populations, but envisioning the grossest impacts of global capitalism to be solved 
through technical or legal instruments that hold states to account is misdirected not 
least because powerful instruments already exist. At the country level, people-led 
movements have immense potential to realize a rights-based approach to health, 
build local accountability and democratize power structures, especially decision-
making related to how best financial resources be utilized. The task for such a 
Framework, therefore, must complement these processes by affecting structural and 
political power mediated by global and transnational elites by holding corporations 
and global institutions accountable.  
The case studies reinforce how global mechanisms adapt poorly to local 
circumstances, especially in the most poverty stricken parts of the world. There is 
compelling evidence that global prescriptions of values such as participation, human 
rights, and accountability have tended to ignore local understandings and ways of 
‘doing’ and served to reinforce power and structural inequities. Neoliberalism has 
increasingly come to frame such prescriptions in global health and is also deeply 
embedded in institutional behavior, political processes, and understanding of socio-
economic ‘realities’. Hence, any alternative conceptions of governance must 
challenge the values that undermine organic processes of reform, address patterns of 
power that result from implementing global mechanisms, and contest processes that 
disadvantage countries and the “global health underclass”. A Framework must be 
cognizant of how structural and material reality is transformed so that application of 
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human rights principles do not become another tokenistic exercise, or impede the 
bargaining position of weaker states in the emerging global order. In contrast to the 
conceived forceful marriage of emancipatory rights and justice principles with global 
structures and norms, we conclude that guaranteeing health and social entitlements 
to people can be achieved through strong citizen-led movements. 
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